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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARIE C. CLAUSSE, Administra-
trix of the Estate of LEON L. 
CLA USSE, Deceased, 
Plaintiff and A ptp1ella;nt, 
vs. 
FIRST SECURITY CORPORA- Case No. 7930 
TION, a corporation, FIRST SE-
CURITY BANK OF UTAH, a 
corporation, and AMERICAN NA-
TIONAL INSURANCE COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Defendants and. Resp,ondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
AMERICAN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Because Appellant's statement of the fac~.s is In-
complete and leaves out many essential details ·Of the 
transactions in question, Respondent insurance com-
pany feels it necessary to restate the facts. 
In December, 1948, Mr. and Mrs. Leon Clausse 
applied for a loan of Twenty-Five Hundred Dollars 
($2,500.00) from the First Security Bank of Utah, NA, 
the loan to be secured by a mortgage on their home 
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in Ogden. (Tr. 42). Later in December Mr. S. T. Jeppe-
sen and Mr. Carl Porter, both Vice-Presidents of the 
hank, visited the home of the Clausses to appraise it 
and advised them that the bank would make the loan. 
(Tr. 43). At the time of this visit Mr. Jeppesen sug-
gested to the Clausses that the hank had a plan whereby 
the Mortgagor could take out a policy of life insurance 
on his life, pay the premiums along with the monthly 
payments on ~the ~1:ortgage, and that the insurance pro-
ceeds would pay ·off the mortgage in the event of the 
death of the Mortgagor and gave Mr. Clausse a pamph-
let deseribing the plan (Plaintiff's Exhibit "A"). 
(Tr. 22-3). On December 18, 1948 the note and the 
mortgage were executed by the Clausses (Defendant's 
Exhi hit ' 'B ' ') . 
On December 27, 1948 Mr. Clausse received a letter 
from the bank outlining the plan and telling them they 
would be given an opportunity to carry it, "if they so 
desired," (Plaintiff's Exhibit "C ") and on January 
5, 1949 11r. Reynolds Blackington, Soliciting Agent of 
Respondent American National Insurance Company, 
called on the Clausses to explain the plan and solicit 
the necessary insurance. (Tr. 30) In the course of the 
diseussion Mr·. Clausse agreed to adopt the plan and 
signed an application for life insurance with American 
National Insurance Company in the sum of Two Thou-
sand Dollars ($2,000.00) (Defendant's Exhibit 1). No 
premium was paid or tendered at the time the applica-
tion was signed (Tr .. 40), and no policy was ever issued 
or delivered. (Tr. 39) Mr. Clausse died on January 24, 
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1949 of a sudden heart attack, although he had appar-
ently passed the physical examination of the insurance 
company, given shortly after the visit of Mr. Blacking-
ton, ( Tr. 32-33). 
The application provided in paragraph 4e thereof: 
"Insurance liability of the company by reas-on 
of this application shall be created ONLY as 
follo\vs: One. Either in accordance with ·the 
terms of the aforementioned conditional receipt 
properly executed and delivered; or Two. By 
complete and concurrent fulfillment at the time 
of any policy delivery of three (3) conditions 
as follows : ( i) Issue of such policy and actual 
delivery of same during the lifetime and good 
health of the person to be insured must have 
taken place; (ii) The whole premiu;m (or reg-
ular installment thereof) must have been settled 
for and accepted by the Company or its author-
ized agent; and (iii) Neither the Company nor 
any person, the Company's agent or not, shall 
by such delivery or otherwise determine at the 
time thereof the existence of such good health, 
but acceptance of such policy by the undersigned 
shall be deemed representation that then ~and 
theretofore no change in such good health has 
taken place since the date hereof.'' . 
The ·conditional receipt mentioned above was never 
issued, it being still attached to the application and 
Appellant makes no claim to coverage thereunder. No 
premium was ever paid or tendered and no policy was 
ever issued. ( Tr. 39-40) 
At the conclusion of Plaintiff's evidence Respon-
dent insurance company moved: (1) to strike all the 
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testimony of Mrs. Clausse and her son, Roscoe, as to 
conversations with Reynolds Blackington on the grounds 
(a) that the testimony viola ted the parol evidence rule, 
as attempting to vary the ~terms of a written instru-
ment (the application) and (b) that there was no evi-
dence of any authority of Blackington to make any 
oral contract on behalf of the insurance company. (2) 
To strike the testimony of Mrs. Clausse as to conversa-
tions with officers of the Defendant First Security 
Bank on the ground that such testimony was hearsay 
and incompetent as to Respondent insurance company, 
as there was no evidence of any authority of the bank 
or its ·officers to act on behalf of the insurance com-
pany, and (3) To dismiss the action under rule 41b on 
the ground that there was no evidence of any contract 
between the insurance company and the Clausses other 
than. the application, and that there was no evidence 
that either the bank, its officers or Blackington had 
any authority other than to solicit the application and 
submit it to the insurance company and had no author-
ity to vary its terms (Tr. 68-69). The trial court, after 
full argument on these motions, ruled, 
"Now at this time gentlemen the Court has 
considered the evidence introduced in this trial 
by the Plain tiff and in considering the allega-
tions in the Complaint of the Plaintiff the Court 
is of the opinion that there is not sufficient fact~ 
to warrant the cause being submitted to the jury 
f.or its deliberation, and at this time a non-suit 
is ordered entered in favor of the Defendants 
and each of them and their motions are granted 
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as against the Plaintiff, and that IS the orde1 
of the Court." (Tr. 75) 
It is Respondent's position that this order of the 
court was correct 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. NO CONTRACT OF LIFE INSURANCE ON THE LIFE 
OF LEON L. CLAUSSE WAS EVER MADE BY RE-
SPONDENT INSURANCE COMPANY. 
A. No insurance liability was created by the application 
signed by Leon L. Clausse. 
B. No Mortgage Cancellation Plan Agreement was made 
with Respondent insurance company. 
II. THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF ANY 
AUTHORITY OF BLACKINGTO·N OR THE BANK OF-
FICERS TO ACT ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 
INSURANCE COMPANY TO MAKE THE CLAIMED 
CONTRACT. 
ARGUMENT 
I. NO CONTRACT OF LIFE INSURANCE ON THE LIFE 
OF LEON L. CLAUSSE WAS EVER MADE BY RE-
SPONDENT INSURANCE CO·MP ANY. 
A. No insurance liability was created by the application 
signed by Leon L. Clausse. 
The only writing evidencing any dealing between 
the Clausses and Respondent insurance company vvas 
the application (Defendant's Exhibit 1). That appli-
cation provided as quoted in the Statement of Facts 
that insurance liability of the company could be created 
by the application only in accordance with the terms 
of the conditional receipt, which was never issued, or 
by delivery of the policy during the lifetime and good 
health of the applicant and the payment of the premium. 
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The evidence is clear and undisputed that no policy 
was ever issued and no premium paid. In view of that 
provision there can be no contractual liability of the 
insurance eompany by virtue of the application, nor 
can there he any liability on some oral contract between 
Clausse and Blackington for insurance coverage con-
trary to the terms of that application. Such a prop-
osition has already been passed upon by this court in 
Field vs. Missouri State Life Insurance Company 
77 Utah 45, 290 Pacific 979. 
In that ease there had been an application sub-
stantially similar to that in the case at bar. One of 
the theories of the Plaintiff was that the soliciting agent 
entered into a temporary oral contract with the as-
sured to insure his life until such time as the applica-
tion ·could be acted upon by the proper officer of the 
Defendant insurance company. Said this court of such 
a contention: 
"By the terms of the written application, the 
insurance is to take effect at the time the appli-
cation is approved by the company, provided 
the first premium is paid in cash, otherwise it 
is not to take effect until the first pren1iun1 i~ 
paid and the policy delivered to and accepted 
by the applicant during his life and good health. 
The receipt that was issued to Mr. Field for the 
premium paid provides that 'insurance ~ubjeet 
to the tern1s and conditions of the policy con-
tract issued shall take effect as of the date of 
approval of above application by the company 
at its home office in Saint L·ouis, Mo. Other\\·ise 
the payment evidenced by this receipt shall be 
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returned.' The language of the application and 
of the receipt is clear and certain. There is no 
necessity of resorting to parol testimony to clar-
ify the meaning of the language used in either 
the application or the receipt. It is impossible 
to reconcile the 'vritten provisions of the ap-
plication and of the receipt wherein it is agreed 
that the insurance shall take effect upon the 
approval of the application by the home office 
of the defendant at St. Louis, Mo., with the claim 
made by the plaintiff and supported by par·ol 
testimony that the insurance should be in force 
as soon as the first premium was paid. Under 
such circumstances full effect must he given to 
the written contract, and the claimed parol 
agreement must be disregarded." (290 Pac 979, 
983) 
In that case the Plaintiff also contended that by 
some oral arrangement between the agent and the as-
sured the provision of the application had been waived. 
This court also disposed of that contention as follows: 
"It would be more in accord with the rule of 
law under dis-cussion to say that, when parties 
reduce a contract to writing, they thereby estop 
themselves from claiming under the terms of a 
prior or contemporaneous parol agreement, and 
also that by entering into a written agreement 
all rights that the parties may have had under 
prior or contemporaneous oral agreements are 
thereby waived. Under the pleadings and the 
admitted documentary evidence in this case it 
was not competent for the plaintiff to show that 
prior to or at the time that Mr. Field signed the 
written application Mr. Cotterell stated that the 
life of 1\!Ir. Field would be insured as soon as 
he paid the first premium.'' ( 290 Pac 979, 983-4) 
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In short, the written application, by its very terms, 
precludes any liability of the company on that document, 
and the parol evidence rule precludes any reliance on 
any oral· agreement tending to vary its terms. 
Appellant apparently recognizes this difficulty for 
1n this opening statement counsel for Plaintiff stated: 
''We are not suing on the life insurance 
policy, that is a matter between the bank and the 
insurance company. '' ( Tr. 4) 
.And in Appellant's brief at page 14, it is again recog-
nized, counsel stating, 
''This is not a suit on said application for life 
insurance.'' 
B. No Mortgage Cancellation Plan Agreement was made 
with Respondent insurance company. 
To es·cape this situation,· Plaintiff has conjured up 
an oral "mortgage cancellation plan", whereby the 
agreement was to insure the mortgage on the Clausse's 
home, not to insure the life of Mr. Clausse. (Appellant's 
Brief Page 2) Under this theory Plaintiff contends 
that the making of the ·application for life insurance 
to the Respondent insurance company was merely one 
of the things which had to be done by the deceased in 
order that he might receive protection on his mortgage 
under this plan,· and that he had no direct interest in 
the life insurance policy, excep·t what might have ac-
crued to him fro1n it under the cancellation agreement 
if he had lived to pay off the mortgage. Taking the 
statement of this theory from Appellant's brief at 
pages 14 and 15 and looking at the same statement 
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made in counsel's opening statement to the jury at 
pages 2, 3 and 4 of the transcript, it is difficult to see 
on "That basis the Respondent insurance company could 
be a proper party to this action. In fact, after Plain-
tiff's counsel's opening statement, a motion to dismiss 
was made on the ground that such opening statement 
failed to state any facts which would constitute a claim 
for relief against the Respondent insurance company. 
This motion was denied by the court, but the ruling 
\vas corrected later \Yhen the motion for dismissal at 
the conclusion of Plaintiff's case was granted. But 
even taking Appellant's theory of the case, and applying 
the rule established by this court that on a motion for 
a non-suit there must be given to the Pl:;tintiff the bene-
fit of every fair and legitimate inference that could be 
drawn from the evidence by the jury, 
Winegar vs. Slim Olson, Inc., ______ Utah ______ , 
250 Pac. 2d 205 ( 1953), 
it is clear that Appellant has no claim for relief against 
Respondent American National Insurance Company. 
For example, analyze the ·claimed ''mortgage cancel-
lation plan" agreement in order to determine its terms. 
A. The Amount of Insurance. The mortgage and 
note were for Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($2,500.00), and if the mortgage was to be cancelled 
the agreement would have to be for a like amount. The 
Appellant admits that this was not so in her Statement 
of Facts. (Appellant's Brief, Page 2). The ,claimed 
agreement was for only Two Thousand Dollars 
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($2,000.00), the amount specified in the application for 
life insurance which Plaintiff rejects as only a forn1 
required by the bank for the purpose of some agree-
ment, not outlined or specified, between it and the in. 
surance company (Appellant's Brief Pages 14 and 15), 
but certainly the life insurance to be issued pursuant 
to the application was the only part of the plan for 
cancellation of the mortgage to the tune of Two Thou-
sand Dollars ( $2,000.00) which concerns the insurance 
company. And such insurance was never issued, as ~Jr. 
Clausse died before the policy was issued and delivered 
and before any premium was tendered or paid. 
B. The Effective Date. What was the effectiYe 
date of the mortgage -cancellation plan claimed by the 
Plaintiff~ It is on this point that Plaintiff's evidence 
becomes most vague and uncertain, yet it is this date 
which is all-important to Plaintiff's right to recovery. 
There must be some substantial evidence of the essen-
tial facts of an agreement effective at a date prior to 
the death of Mr. Clausse in order to entitle Plaintiff 
to go to the jury. 
Winegar vs. Slim tOlson, Inc. 
Supra 
This date could not have been on the day in De-
cember, 1948 when the two bank officials called at the 
Clausse home for appraisal purposes and mentioned 
the plan to Mr. Clausse. Exhibit "A" handed to 
' Plaintiff at that time, merely announced the plan and 
suggested that the prospect ask for full details thereof, 
10 
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and there \Yas yet no mortgage to cancel. 
It \Yas not, as _._-\.ppellant elaims in her brief at Page 
12, the date "~hen the mortgage and note \Yere signed 
and deliYered to the bank. Plaintiff testified that Mr. 
Jeppesen agreed at that time to send a representative 
out to explain the plan and write the insurance. (Tr. 25) 
Besides, on Decen1ber 27, 1948, about a week later, 
Plaintiff received a letter from the Real Estate Man-
agement Company, a subsidiary of the bank, signed by 
an officer of the bank, telling them a representative 
of the insurance company would call explaining the 
plan and give them an opportunity to carry it, "if they 
desired.'' (Plaintiff's Exhibit '' C '') Clearly neither 
the -Clausses nor the bank believed a ''plan'' was yet in 
effect. 
The next possibility as to an effective ·date would 
be January 5, 1949, when Mr. Blackington ·called to 
explain the plan and attempted to sell the necessary 
insurance. At the .conclusion of this session Mr. Clausse 
executed the application (Exhibit 1), and in arguing 
for this date Plaintiff runs into the express terms of 
that application. To escape this road block, Appellant 
contends that the making of the application to the Re-
spondent insurance company was merely one of the 
things which had to be done by Mr. Clausse to receive 
the protection on his mortgage under the mortgage 
cancellation plan (Appellant's Brief, Page 14). 
It has already been shown that neither party 
thought there was yet a mortgage cancellation plan 
agreement, and it is a basic principle of contract law 
11 
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that requires no citation of precedents that until there 
is a meeting of the minds there can be no contract. 
Therefore how could the execution of the application 
' by Mr. Clausse be merely a step in his performance 
of the terms of the mortgage cancellation plan agree-
ment' · And certainly the signing of the application 
could not make the cancellation plan agreement effective 
as to the insurance company - if it was ever intended 
to be a party to such an agreement, as the application 
by its very terms, which ·counsel for Appellant claims 
he does not seek to vary,· says no insurance, unless and 
until delivery of the policy and payment of the premium. 
Despite such protestations of acceptance of the 
terms of the application (Appellant's Brief, Page 14} 
Plaintiff and her son, Roscoe, both attempted to and 
were allowed to testify, over the timely objections of 
Counsel for Respondent insurance company, that Mr. 
Blackington, the soliciting agent, said the insurance 
would take effect ''immediately and all during the 
period of the mortgage", (Tr. 36), and again, "imme-
diately when the application was signed", (Tr. 38). 
Roscoe said Blackington said it "\Vas "in effect", (Tr. 
64), which Roscoe guessed to mean when the mortgage 
was executed, and even that Blackington said that the 
''mortgage insurance'' was in effect, i.e., that the mort-
gage would be cancelled upon death, irrespective of 
whether Mr. Clausse could pass the required physical 
examination arranged by Blackington (Tr. 66), although 
his mother, the Appellant, admitted that she under-
stood that Mr. Clausse had to pass the physical exmn-
12 
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ination ( Tr. 48), to qualify for life insurance. 
LeaYing aside for the moment the question of au-
thority of 1Ir. Blackington to make such statements, 
it is clear that such testimony is incompetent and in 
direct contravention of the parol evidence rule. 
Field vs. ltlissouri State Life Insu,rwnce Company 
Supra 
Plaintiff admitted on cross examination that she 
knew and understood that there had to be a life in-
surance policy taken out a.nd maintained before the 
plan could work (Tr. 46), and that the mortgage could 
not be credited with any Two Th-ousand Dollar 
($2,000.00) payment in the event of the death of Mr. 
Clausse unless there 'vas a policy issued by the insur-
ance company (Tr. 48). Therefore, unless the terms of 
the application are to be entirely ignored, which Plain-
tiff says is not the case, the effective date of the cov-
erage under the plan ·could be no earlier than the is-
suance of the policy during the lifetime and good health 
of Mr. Clausse, and the payment of the premium, neither 
of which events ever occurred. 
C. The place of the insurance comp~any in the 
mortgage cancellation plan. 
Finally, in determining whether ,Plaintiff's evidence 
could possibly support any contract with Respondent 
insurance company, the part the insurance company was 
claimed to play in the plan must be considered. Plain-
tiff admitted on cross examination (Tr. 46-48} that 
she and Mr. Clausse understood the plan contemplated 
13 
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a life insurance policy on the life of Mr. Clausse pay-
able to the bank to pay off the loan, and that there had 
to be su·ch a policy issued be'fore the plan could work. 
In other vvords, the only part the insurance company 
played in the picture was to write an insurance policy 
on the life of the mortgagor with the mortgag·ee bank 
as primary beneficiary. Under Plaintiff's theory of a 
cancellation plan agreement that was one of the steps 
to the plan, but also under this theory the insurance 
company could play no other part. It was not lending 
the money on the security of the mortgage. It ":a.s not 
agreeing to cancel the note and mortgage in the event 
of the death of Mr. Clausse. All it "vas to do "ras to 
write the insurance policy, and for that purpose ~~rr. 
Blackington called at the Clausse 's home to have ~{r. 
Clausse sign an application. Unfortunately Mr. Clausse 
died before the policy was issued. Counsel for Appel-
lant recognizes in his. brief that if this were the ordin-
ary situation, without the bank and the claimed mort. 
gage ·cancellation plan involved, the terms of the ap-
plication would be definitive. It would be just the not 
too unusual case where the applicant for life insurance 
dies before the policy is issued or became effective. 
J?ringing the bank into the picture and its mortgage 
cancellation plan cannot change the legal relationship 
of the insurance company with Mr. Clausse. Its con-
tractua~ liability can be based only on the application. 
That application, as Appellant admits, says no insur-
ance liability until certain conditions are met, which 
all agree were never met. 
14 
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_,__\nd "·hat about consideration 1 The only consider-
ation to the insurance company \Yould be the actual 
payment of the premium. And no premium was ever 
paid or ever tendered. On that point alone, it is clear 
that the insurance company's participation in the 
claimed 1nortgage cancellation plan agreement vvas never 
consummated. 
II. THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF ANY 
AUTHORITY OF BLACKINGTON OR THE BANK OF-
FICERS TO ACT ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 
INSURANCE COMPANY TO MAKE THE CLAIMED 
CONTRACT. 
Assuming that in some mysterious fashion the 
terms of an agreement by the bank and the insurance 
company with Mr. and J\1rs. Clausse to provide for a 
mortgage cancellation plan can be spelled out fron1 
the evidence offered hy the Plaintiff, such agreement 
providing that in the event of the death of Mr. Clausse, 
the note and mortgage of the Clausses would be can-
celled by the bank, in which cancellation the insurance 
company would participate, even though it had received 
no premium, and issued no insurance policy. What evi-
dence is there of an authorized agent of Respondent 
insurance company making such an agreement1 In other 
words, by whose magic was this remarkable agreement 
claimed to have been created 1 
Appellant first relies on claimed statements made 
by Mr. Porter and Mr. Jeppesen, two Vice-Presidents 
of the First Security Bank of Utah. Now Respondent 
insurance company is a Texas corporation engaged in 
the life insurance business in Utah and elsewhere. In 
15 
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order to enter into agreements, no matter how magical 
their terms it must act through agents having author-
' ity. Even Appellant does not have termerity to claim 
that either of these t"\\70 gentlemen had authority to act 
for the insurance company. She claims apparent au-
thority. Appellant at Pages 6 and 7 of her brief dis-
cusses the apparent scope of authority of Jeppesen and 
Porter as binding the hank and at Page 17 states that 
the facts of the case are of such a nature as to raise a 
''strong inference'' that both Blackington and the bank 
officers were representing both the insurance company 
and the bank. 
At Page 16 of Appellant's brief appears a quo~a­
tion from a Washington case, 
Pagni vs. New York Life Insurance Company 
173 Wash. 322, 23 Pacific 2d 6, 
to the effect that an insurance company, like other ·cor-
porate principals, is· bound by the acts of agents 'vi thin 
the scope of their app-arent authority. With this propo-
sition Respondent insurance company cannot and does 
not differ. But counsel for Plaintiff neglected to point 
out 'that the Washington court first found, 
''In the case at bar there was evidence of 
apparent authority, a custom of which the in-
surer had knowledge, a -course of conduct which 
it sanctioned, which would warrant a jury in 1 
finding that the insurer had clothed its soliciting 1 1 
·agent with authority to act for it as he did.~~ 
23 Pac. 2nd 6 at page 15. 
It is submitted that in this case at bar there is no eYi· 1 1 
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dence of apparent auth~rity by an agent, apparent or 
actual, of the insurance ·company. No custom, no course 
of conduct by the insurance con1pany was sho'vn which 
would "'"arrant a finder of fact in concluding that Re-
spondent insurance company had clothed Mr. Black-
ington or either of the bank officers with authority to 
act for it as Plaintiff claims they did. 
Apparent authority is defined in the Restatement 
of Agency, Sec. 8, as follows: 
''Apparent authority is the p·ower of an ap-
parent agent to affect the legal relations of an 
apparent principal with respect to a third person 
by acts done in accordance with such p~rincipal's 
manifestations of consent to such third person 
that such agent shall act as his agent." (emphasis 
supplied) 
and in Section 27, it is stated that apparent authority 
is created by written or spoken words or ·any other 
conduct of the principal, which, reasonably interpreted, 
causes the third person to believe that the principal 
consents to have the act done on his behalf by the per-
son purporting to act for him. The issue is not, as Ap-
pellant contends at Page 8 of her brief, whether the 
claimed agents acted in such a way as to justify Mr. 
Clausse in assuming they had authority to make the 
claimed contract, but whether the principal, i.e the 
insurance company, engaged in such conduct as to rea-
sonably create that belief by Mr. Clausse~ That appar-
ent authority requires some conduct by the principal 
to establish such authority has been recognized by this 
court in 
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Malia vs. Giles 
100 Utah 562, 114 Pac. 2d 208, at 211, 
where it was said, 
"The extent of an agent's apparent authority 
is not measured by the extent of power exercised 
by the agent; bu.t by the p·rincipal's conduct ·with 
reference to the power exercised by the agent. 
Either by action or by inaction \Yhere there i~ 
a duty to act, the principal may create a situation, 
the reasonable interpretation of which, by a 
third party with whom the agent is about to 
deal, is such as to lead that third party to belieYe 
that the agent has authority to deal with him as 
contemplated. Under such circumstances the 
law will hold the principal responsible to that 
third party for the results of that deal with tl1r 
agent.'' (emphasis supplied) 
Such manifestations of conduct to create apparent 
authority must be gathered from the facts and circum-
stances of the transaction as shown by the evidence, 
U. 8. Bond and' Fina.nce Corporation 
vs. 
National Building and Loan Association 
80 Utah 62, 12 Pac. 2d 758, 
These undisputed facts and circumstances so far as 
Jeppesen and Porter are concerned are: 
(1) Jeppesen and Porter were not employees of 
the insurance company. They were ·officers of the First 
Security Bank. They were not even apparent agent~ 
of the insurance company. 
(2) Jeppesen was .an old friend of the Claus~e!' 
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and his visit to their hon1e in December, 1948 was to 
appraise it for a bank loan, at which time, as an old 
friend, he suggested they take .out the plan (Tr. 50) 
and Plaintiff then understood that Mr. Jeppesen did 
not \vrite life insurance (Tr. 50). 
(3) The Clausses had never had any dealings with 
the Bank or Insurance Company before with respect 
to a mortgage cancellation insurance plan ( Tr. 40) ; so 
there was not prior ·conduct of either principal upon 
which Plaintiff can claim reliance. 
( 4) The pamphlet (Exhibit "A") made no ref-
erence to Respondent insurance company. 
(5) The letter of December 27, 1948 suggests the 
Clausses consider the mortgage cancellation plan and 
referred to Mr. Blackington, the local representative 
of American National Insurance Company, whom the 
bank was asking to call to explain the plan and to give 
them the opportunity to carry it, if tP,ey so desired. 
Therefore, until Mr. Blackington called on January 
5, 1949, Respondent insurance company had engaged in 
no conduct with these Defendants nor in any -conduct 
of which these Defendants were aware, which would 
create a situation so as to lead the Clausses reasonably 
to believe either Jeppesen or Porter had authority to 
deal or speak as the agents of the ins-urance company. 
In fact, until the letter of December 27, which was after 
all the alleged conversations with either Porter or J ep-
pesen, there was not even any mention of the American 
National Insurance Company. It is clear and undis-
puted that Jeppesen and Porter were not agents of the 
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Respondent insurance company, had no apparent au 
thority to act as such, and that any alleged statements 
made by them were incompetent and hearsay as to 
Respondent insurance company. 
The only other person whom Appellant clain1~ 
acted for the Respondent insurance company to make 
the oral mortgage cancellation contract with Plaintiff 
· was Reynolds Blackington. "What are the facts and 
circumstances shown by the evidence as to the conduct 
of Respondent insurance company as to him and hi~ 
authority~ 
(1) He was the soliciting agent of the insurance 
company. He signed the application as such (Exhibit 
1), and that same application expressly stated the 
methods of creating insurance liability of the con1pany 
as only either (a) in accordance with the terms of the 
conditional receipt, still attached to the application when 
it was introduced in evidence or (b) by delivery of the 
policy and payment of the premium. The conditional 
receipt referred to expressly provided, 
''No a.gen t (which term includes every com-
pany representative) is authorized or has any 
power to make, modify or discharge the provi-
sions of this receipt, to extend the time for pay. 
ing any premium, to waive any Company's right 
or requirement or to bind the Company by any 
written or ·Oral promise not contained in this 
receipt and any policy issued in pursuanre of 
such application, except that the Company's 
President or Secretary 1nay accomplish all such 
acts by a written sta tern en t bearing the signa-
ture of the official who made it and the date of 
its execution.'' 
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This court has made it clear that "\vhen the appli-
cation expressly so limits the authority of the soliciting 
agent he cannot "\vaive the conditions of the application, 
Jones vs. New York Life Insurance Con~pany 
69 Utah 172, 253 Pac. 200 at 202. 
(2) Nor did Blackington tell the Clausses he had 
authority to change or modify the terms of the appli-
cation (Tr. 38) and the Clausses did not think he had 
such authority (Tr. 39). 
(3) There had been no previous dealings with 
Blackington before (Tr. 40) by the Clauses and they 
did not know him (Tr. 29). 
There is no other evidence of any other dealing 
with this Defendant by Plaintiff or any acts by this 
Defendant holding Mr. Blackington or anyone else as 
its agent with authority to make a contract of the nature 
Plaintiff claims. It is submitted, therefore, that the 
testimony of Mrs. Clausse and Roscoe Clausse as to 
the alleged statements by Blackington in their conver-
sations with him was incompetent and hearsay as to 
Respondent insurance company. It is further submitted 
that such testim·ony was incompetent as in contravention 
of the parol evidence rule. It is submitted that there 
is no competent evidence upon which reasonable men 
could find that the Respondent insurance company, on 
any basis, became a party to any mortgage cancella-
tion plan or a party to any policy of insurance on the 
life of Mr. Clausse. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that for the reasons above shown 
the trial court's ruling granting the motions of Respon-
dent insurance company \Vas correct on the facts and 
the law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT 
& MABEY 
PETER W. BILLINGS 
.Attorneys for Respondent 
American National Insurance Co. 
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